The conference aims to provide an overview of the advances that Game Theory has brought to the field of economics and to bring out new challenges for the future. For this, leading researchers in Game Theory will give lectures on different topics in both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory and their applications to the field of economics covering a variety of areas in Economics as experimental economics, behavioural economics, information economics, industrial organization, political economy, evolutionary growth and public and welfare economics.
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern published in 1944 their book “Theory of games and economic behavior”. In 2014 we celebrate the 70th anniversary of this seminal work, which has changed forever the way in which economics is analysed and understood.
During these 70 years, the relevance of Game Theory for the development of Economic Theory has been clearly shown. As recognition of the achievements that Game Theory has brought to Economics, eight game theorists have received the Nobel Prize in Economics. In 1994, John F. Nash, Reinhard Selten and John C. Harsanyi became Economics Nobel for their pioneering analysisof equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games. In 2005, Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling achieved the Nobel Prize in Economics for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis. In 2007, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson received the Nobel Prize in Economics for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory. Many other Nobel-prize winners in Economics, such as George Akerlof, Finn Kydland, James Mirrlees, Edward Prescott, Michael Spence, Joseph Stiglitz and William Vickrey made contributions that fit the Game-Theoretic paradigm.
We have a promising programme with twenty prominent speakers focusing on a wide variety of topics. Jörgen Weibull, Peyton Young, Karl Schlag, Mamuro Kaneko and Arno Riedl will all address the longstanding issue of coordination on equilibrium beliefs from interesting perspectives and attempt to reconcile empirics and theory. Roberto Serrano will quantify the divergence from rational behaviour. George Mailath will review the key lessons of repeated games and its unresolved issues, while Geir Asheim links repeated resource depletion to intergenerational equity. The unresolved issue of forward-looking deviating groups of players in co-operative games will be tackled by Francis Bloch for partition function forms and by Jean-Jacques Herings for social and economic networks.
Other speakers will apply Game Theory to Economics and Political Science. Inés Macho Stadler will explain the coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labour markets. Maria Montero will address proportional gains to voting weights in legislative bargaining. Rakesh Vohra will theorize about why we commonly observe fragmented markets with multiple trading venues, while Guido Schäfer will establish the near-efficiency of two commonly-observed market mechanisms for auctioning multiple units. The recent EU-currency crisis with defaulting countries and interlinked financial companies shows the relevance of bankruptcy problems. William Thomson will address the current state of the art in claim games and identify future challenges, while Peter Borm will axiomatize the per-capita Nucleolus in a way that blends claims and minimal rights. Hans Peters will axiomatize the notion of power in case firms and investment companies exercise mutual control, in particular by owning each other’s stocks. Speakers Salvador Barberà, Philippe Jehiel and Eric van Damme have not yet disclosed their topic.
Gerard van der Laan