# 11-052/1 (2011-03-14)

Author(s)
Rene van den Brink, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Anna Khmelnitskaya, Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg, Russia; Gerard van der Laan, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Keywords:
TU game, communication graph, Myerson value, fairness, efficiency
JEL codes:
C71

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economics Letters', 2012, 117, 786-789.

We introduce an efficient solution for games with communication graph structures and show that it is characterized by efficiency, fairness and a new axiom called component balancedness. This latter axiom compares for every component in the communication graph the total payoff to the players of this component in the game itself to the total payoff of these players when applying the solution to the subgame induced by this component.