# 12-012/1 (2012-02-10)

Author(s)
Arantza Estévez-Fernández, VU University Amsterdam; María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Vigo University; Manuel Alfredo Mosquera, Vigo University; Estela Sánchez- Rodríguez, Vigo University
Keywords:
Cooperative game theory, compromise admissible games, bankruptcy, core cover, complexity
JEL codes:
C71

In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.