A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.
# 12-136/II (2012-12-07)
- Rene van den Brink, VU University Amsterdam; Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University; Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University; Boram Park, Rutgers University
- TU-game, equal division solution, CIS-value, ENSC-value, population solidarity, consistency
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