# 14-056/V (2014-05-09)

Randolph Sloof, University of Amsterdam; Mirjam van Praag, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark
Residual Income, Economic Value Added, distortion, performance measurement, incentive compensation
JEL codes:
D21, G35, J33, L21, M12, M40, M52

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economics and Management Strategy', 2015, 24(1), 74-91.

Distorted performance measures in compensation contracts elicit suboptimal behavioral responses that may even prove to be dysfunctional (gaming). This paper applies the empirical test developed by Courty and Marschke (2008) to detect whether the widely used class of Residual Income based performance measures —such as Economic Value Added (EVA)— is distorted, leading to unintended agent behavior. The paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to account for changes in economic circumstances and the self-selection of firms using EVA. Our findings indicate that EVA is a distorted performance measure that elicits the gaming response.

Submitted to the 'Journal of Economics and Management Strategy'.