Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Summer School Experimental Economics

The Behavioral and Experimental Economics group has an influential position in this field in the Netherlands and Europe. CREED, the Amsterdam-based group, focuses particularly on three main projects: economics of political decision making; bounded rationality and institutions and experimental economics. The research of the Rotterdam-based group focuses on two broad themes: decision under risk and uncertainty and intertemporal choice.

Cooperative Behavior, Strategic Interaction and Complex Systems

This research group focuses on: (non-)cooperative game theory; nonlinear dynamics and complex systems; bounded rationality, learning and heterogenous expectations; dynamic models of collective behavior and social networks & dynamic optimization.

Econometrics and Operations Research

Research themes: time series econometrics, panel data, Bayesian econometrics, applied econometrics and econometric methodology. Applications can be found in areas as diverse as monetary economics, labor economics, marketing and asset pricing. Some fellows in this group focus on operations research.

Finance

The Finance group at TI spans many of the core fields in finance: asset pricing, corporate finance, financial econometrics, market microstructure, and financial institutions.

Labor, Health, Education and Development

At TI, a large group of fellows works in different areas of labour, health, education and development.

Macroeconomics and International Economics

Fellows in the Macroeconomics and International Economics group carry out research on growth, innovation, international trade and factor mobility, the role of economic geography, banking and monetary economics, and fiscal policy.

Organizations and Markets

The Organizations and Markets (OM) group spans many areas in (applied) microeconomics, including the economics of organizations, industrial organization, entrepreneurship, innovation, and auctions.

Spatial, Transport and Environmental Economics

The STEE group addresses four themes: urban and regional dynamics, land use, transportation, and environment and resources. Many fellows combine policy research with fundamental research.

University:
University of Amsterdam
Researchgroup:
Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Interests:
Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Field Experiments, Political Economy, Public Economics
Function:
Professor of Experimental Economics
Email:
Arthur (A.J.H.C.) Schram
Phone:
+31 (0)20-525 4293 (4126 secr.)
URL:
Link to personal website

Key publications by author

Academic Publications & Refereed Academic Publications:

  • Robalo, P., Schram, A., & Sonnemans, J. (2017). Other-regarding Preferences, In-Group Bias and Political Participation: An Experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 62, 130-154. DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.04.009 [details]
  • Weber, M., & Schram, A. (2017). The Non-Equivalence of Labour Market Taxes: A Real-Effort Experiment. Economic Journal, 127(604), 2187-2215. DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12365 [details]
  • Gërxhani, K., Buskens, V., & Schram, A. (Eds.) (2015). Journal of applied mathematics. Journal of applied mathematics[details]
  • Großer, J., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2006). Neighborhood information exchange and voter participation: an experimental study. American Political Science Review, 100(2), 235-248. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055406062137 [details]
  • Gërxhani, K., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2006). Tax evasion and income source: A comparative experimental study. Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(3), 402-422. DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2005.08.002 [details]
  • Goeree, J. K., Offerman, T. J. S., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2006). Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(3), 555-581. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.011 [details]
  • Seinen, I., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2006). Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. European Economic Review, 50(3), 581-602. DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.10.005 [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (2005). Artificiality: the tension between internal and external validity in economic experiments. Journal of Economic Methodology, 12(2), 225-237. DOI: 10.1080/13501780500086081 [details]
  • Bornstein, G., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (2004). Do Democracies breed Chickens? In R. Suleiman, D. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. Messick (Eds.), Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas (pp. 248-269). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [details]
  • Brandts, J., Saijo, T., & Schram, A. (2004). A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Public Goods Games. Public Choice, 119(3-4), 381-424. DOI: 10.1023/B:PUCH.0000033329.53595.1b [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (2003). EXperimental Public Choice. In C. Rowley, & F. Schneider (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. [details]
  • Cox, J., Offerman, T. J. S., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2002). Competition For vs On the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. International Economic Review, 43, 709-736. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00032 [details]
  • Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offermans, T. (2001). Expectation Formation in Step-Level Public Good Games. Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 250-269. DOI: 10.1093/ei/39.2.250 [details]
  • Brandts, J., & Schram, A. (2001). Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the Contribution Function Approach. Journal of Public Economics, 79(2), 399-427. DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00120-6 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2001). Expectation Formation in Step-Level Public Good Games. Economic Inquiry, 39(2), 250-269. DOI: 10.1093/ei/39.2.250 [details]
  • Sadiraj, K., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2000). Informed and Uniformed Investors in an Experimental Ponzi Scheme. CREED Working Paper[details]
  • Seinen, I., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2000). Social Status and Group Norms: Indirect Reciprocity in a Helping Game. CREED Working Paper[details]
  • Jacobsen, B., Potters, J. J. M., Schram, A. J. H. C., van Winden, F. A. A. M., & Wit, J. (2000). (In)accuracy of a Political Stockmarket: The Influence of Common Value Structures. European Economic Review, 44, 205-230. DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00081-6 [details]
  • Gërxhani, K., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2000). Albanian Political-economics: Cosequences of a Clan Culture. LICOS Discussion Paper, 92[details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (2000). Sorting out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations. Public Choice, 103, 231-258. DOI: 10.1023/A:1005036003561 [details]
  • Gërxhani, K., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (2000). Politics in Transition Economies; Consequences of a Clan Culture. Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition, 4, 5-14. [details]
  • Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offermans, T. (1999). Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When Partners Drift Apart. Economics Letters, 62(1), 35-41. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1 [details]
  • Gërxhani, K., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1999). Politics in transition economies: consequences of a clan culture. CREED Working Paper[details]
  • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1999). Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When Partners Really Become Strangers. Economics Letters, (62), 35-41. DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1 [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (1998). Ik en de Ander: Mensbeelden in de Experimentele Economie. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. [details]
  • Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offermans, T. (1998). Learning by experience and learning by imitating successful others. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(76), 559-575. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00109-1 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1998). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. European Journal of Political Economy, 14(1), 89-100. DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00044-X [details]
  • Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offermans, T. (1998). Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(1), 143-161. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00042-5 [details]
  • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1998). Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34, 143-161. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00042-5 [details]
  • Cox, J. C., Offerman, T. J. S., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1998). Competition For vs On the the Rails: A Laboratory Experiment. Working Paper[details]
  • Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offermans, T. (1998). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. European Journal of Political Economy, 14(1), 89-100. [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (1997). Do People care about Democracy? Public Choice, 91, 49-51. DOI: 10.1023/A:1004925017684 [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1997). De Opkomst van de Experimentele Economie. Tijdschrift voor Politieke Ekonomie, 19, 34-55. [details]
  • van Riel, A., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1997). Weimar Woes and the Authoritarian Alternative: Politico economic Developments in Interbellum Germany. In J. Komlos, & S. Eddie (Eds.), Selected Cliometric Studies on German Economic History. (pp. 218-260). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. [details]
  • van Ophem, J. C. M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1997). Sequential and Simultaneous Logit: A Nested Model. Empirical Economics, 22, 131-152. DOI: 10.1007/BF01188174 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Quantal response models in step-level public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-20/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Voter turnout as a participation game: an experimental investigation. International Journal of Game Theory, 25, 385-406. DOI: 10.1007/BF02425263 [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Strategic behaviour in public good games. (TI discussion paper; No. 96-111/1). Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1996). Belief learning in pubic goods games: sophisticated strategics versus naive bayesians. (TI discussion paper 95-132). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Value orientations, expectations and voluntary contributions in public goods. Economic Journal, 106, 817-845. DOI: 10.2307/2235360 [details]
  • Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offermans, T. (1996). Value Orientations, Expectations and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods. Economic Journal, 106(437), 817-845. DOI: 10.2307/2235360 [details]
  • Olson, M., Schram, A. J. H. C., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (1996). De veiling van etherfrequenties door de overheid. Amsterdam: CREED. [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C., & Sonnemans, J. H. (1996). Why people vote: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, 417-442. DOI: 10.1016/0167-4870(96)00022-0 [details]
  • Sonnemans, J. H., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Offerman, T. J. S. (1995). Public good provision and public bad prevention: the effect of framing. (TI discussion paper 95-009). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
  • Jacobsen, B., Schram, A. J. H. C., van Winden, F. A. A. M., & Wit, J. (1995). Inefficiency of a political stock market. (TI discussion paper 95-234). Unknown Publisher. [details]
  • Offerman, T. J. S., Sonnemans, J. H., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1995). Value orientations, expectations, and voluntary contributions in public goods. (TI discussion paper 95-008). onbekend: Afdeling Algemene Economie. [details]
  • Bykowsky, M., Olson, M., & Schram, A. J. H. C. (1995). Veiling van etherfrequenties. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 80, 201-205. [details]
  • Schram, A., & van Winden, F. (1994). The Role of Inter- and Intragroup Interaction in the Voter Turnout Decision. In H. Brandstätter, & W. Güth (Eds.), Essays in Economic Psychology Springer Verlag. [details]
  • van Riel, A., & Schram, A. (1993). Weimar Economic Decline, Nazi Economic Recovery, and the Stabilization of Political Dictatorship. The Journal of Economic History, 53, 71-105. DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700012390 [details]
  • Schram, A. J. H. C. (1992). Rational Choice Models of Individual Political Behavior in the Netherlands. European Journal of Political Research, 21, 423-452. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1992.tb00908.x [details]
  • Schram, A. (1992). Testing Economic Theories of Voter Behavior Using Micro-Data. Applied Economics, 24(4), 419-428. DOI: 10.1080/00036849200000016 [details]
  • Schram, A., & van Winden, F. (1991). Why People Vote: Free Riding and the Production and Consumption of Social Pressure. Journal of Economic Psychology, 12, 575-620. DOI: 10.1016/0167-4870(91)90002-B [details]
  • Schram, A. (1990). A Dynamic Model of Voter Behavior and the Demand for Public Goods among Social Groups in Great Britain. Journal of Public Economics, 41, 147-182. DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(90)90056-N [details]
  • Schram, A., & van Winden, F. (1989). Revealed Preferences for Public Goods: Applying a Model of Voter Behavior. Public Choice, 60(3), 259-282. DOI: 10.1007/BF00159397 [details]
  • van Winden, F., Schram, A., & Groot, F. (1987). The Interaction between Economics and Politics: Modelling Cycles. European Journal of Political Research, 15, 185-202. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1987.tb00872.x [details]
  • Schram, A., & van Winden, F. (1986). An Economic Model of Party Choice in a Multi-Party System: An Empirical Application to the Netherlands. European Journal of Political Economy, 2(4), 465-497. DOI: 10.1016/0176-2680(86)90016-9 [details]
  • Jaarsma, B., Schram, A., & van Winden, F. (1986). On the Voting Participation of Public Bureaucrats. Public Choice, 48, 183-187. DOI: 10.1007/BF00179731 [details]