Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Summer School Experimental Economics

The Behavioral and Experimental Economics group has an influential position in this field in the Netherlands and Europe. CREED, the Amsterdam-based group, focuses particularly on three main projects: economics of political decision making; bounded rationality and institutions and experimental economics. The research of the Rotterdam-based group focuses on two broad themes: decision under risk and uncertainty and intertemporal choice.

Cooperative Behavior, Strategic Interaction and Complex Systems

This research group focuses on: (non-)cooperative game theory; nonlinear dynamics and complex systems; bounded rationality, learning and heterogenous expectations; dynamic models of collective behavior and social networks & dynamic optimization.

Econometrics and Operations Research

Research themes: time series econometrics, panel data, Bayesian econometrics, applied econometrics and econometric methodology. Applications can be found in areas as diverse as monetary economics, labor economics, marketing and asset pricing. Some fellows in this group focus on operations research.


The Finance group at TI spans many of the core fields in finance: asset pricing, corporate finance, financial econometrics, market microstructure, and financial institutions.

Labor, Health, Education and Development

At TI, a large group of fellows works in different areas of labour, health, education and development.

Macroeconomics and International Economics

Fellows in the Macroeconomics and International Economics group carry out research on growth, innovation, international trade and factor mobility, the role of economic geography, banking and monetary economics, and fiscal policy.

Organizations and Markets

The Organizations and Markets (OM) group spans many areas in (applied) microeconomics, including the economics of organizations, industrial organization, entrepreneurship, innovation, and auctions.

Spatial, Transport and Environmental Economics

The STEE group addresses four themes: urban and regional dynamics, land use, transportation, and environment and resources. Many fellows combine policy research with fundamental research.

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 153, 33-45

Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with each other for a specific position in the queue. Then, the winner can decide to take up the position or sell it to the others. In the former case, the rest of the players will proceed to compete for the remaining positions in the same manner; whereas for the latter case the seller can propose a queue with corresponding payments to the others which can be accepted or rejected. In this paper we show that, when the players are competing for the first position in the queue, then the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the corresponding mechanism coincides with the well-known maximal transfer rule, while an efficient queue is always formed in equilibrium. We also argue that changing the mechanism so that the players compete for the last position implements the minimal transfer rule. The analysis discovers a striking relationship between pessimism and optimism in this type of decision making.

To read the article click here.