Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Summer School Experimental Economics

The Behavioral and Experimental Economics group has an influential position in this field in the Netherlands and Europe. CREED, the Amsterdam-based group, focuses particularly on three main projects: economics of political decision making; bounded rationality and institutions and experimental economics. The research of the Rotterdam-based group focuses on two broad themes: decision under risk and uncertainty and intertemporal choice.

Cooperative Behavior, Strategic Interaction and Complex Systems

This research group focuses on: (non-)cooperative game theory; nonlinear dynamics and complex systems; bounded rationality, learning and heterogenous expectations; dynamic models of collective behavior and social networks & dynamic optimization.

Econometrics and Operations Research

Research themes: time series econometrics, panel data, Bayesian econometrics, applied econometrics and econometric methodology. Applications can be found in areas as diverse as monetary economics, labor economics, marketing and asset pricing. Some fellows in this group focus on operations research.


The Finance group at TI spans many of the core fields in finance: asset pricing, corporate finance, financial econometrics, market microstructure, and financial institutions.

Labor, Health, Education and Development

At TI, a large group of fellows works in different areas of labour, health, education and development.

Macroeconomics and International Economics

Fellows in the Macroeconomics and International Economics group carry out research on growth, innovation, international trade and factor mobility, the role of economic geography, banking and monetary economics, and fiscal policy.

Organizations and Markets

The Organizations and Markets (OM) group spans many areas in (applied) microeconomics, including the economics of organizations, industrial organization, entrepreneurship, innovation, and auctions.

Spatial, Transport and Environmental Economics

The STEE group addresses four themes: urban and regional dynamics, land use, transportation, and environment and resources. Many fellows combine policy research with fundamental research.

Journal of Accounting Research 2013, 51 (5), 1159–1186

This paper investigates reporting honesty when managers have monetary incentives to overstate their performance. We argue that managers who report about their performance will take into account how their report affects their peers (i.e., other managers at the same hierarchical level). This effect depends on the design of the organization’s control system, in particular, on the reward structure and the information policy regarding individual performance reports. The reward structure determines if peers’ monetary payoff is increased or decreased when managers claim a higher level of performance. The information policy determines if managers will be able to link individual peers to their reports and affects the nonmonetary costs of breaking social norms. We present the results of a laboratory experiment. As predicted, we find that participants are more likely to overstate their performance if this increases the monetary payoff of others than if their reported performance decreases others’ monetary gains. In addition, overstatements are lower under an open information policy, where each individual’s reported performance is made public, compared to a closed information policy, where participants only learn the average performance of the other participants. Our findings have several important implications for management accounting research and practice.