Behavioral and Experimental Economics

Summer School Experimental Economics

The Behavioral and Experimental Economics group has an influential position in this field in the Netherlands and Europe. CREED, the Amsterdam-based group, focuses particularly on three main projects: economics of political decision making; bounded rationality and institutions and experimental economics. The research of the Rotterdam-based group focuses on two broad themes: decision under risk and uncertainty and intertemporal choice.

Cooperative Behavior, Strategic Interaction and Complex Systems

This research group focuses on: (non-)cooperative game theory; nonlinear dynamics and complex systems; bounded rationality, learning and heterogenous expectations; dynamic models of collective behavior and social networks & dynamic optimization.

Econometrics and Operations Research

Research themes: time series econometrics, panel data, Bayesian econometrics, applied econometrics and econometric methodology. Applications can be found in areas as diverse as monetary economics, labor economics, marketing and asset pricing. Some fellows in this group focus on operations research.


The Finance group at TI spans many of the core fields in finance: asset pricing, corporate finance, financial econometrics, market microstructure, and financial institutions.

Labor, Health, Education and Development

At TI, a large group of fellows works in different areas of labour, health, education and development.

Macroeconomics and International Economics

Fellows in the Macroeconomics and International Economics group carry out research on growth, innovation, international trade and factor mobility, the role of economic geography, banking and monetary economics, and fiscal policy.

Organizations and Markets

The Organizations and Markets (OM) group spans many areas in (applied) microeconomics, including the economics of organizations, industrial organization, entrepreneurship, innovation, and auctions.

Spatial, Transport and Environmental Economics

The STEE group addresses four themes: urban and regional dynamics, land use, transportation, and environment and resources. Many fellows combine policy research with fundamental research.

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, 73(2), 507-16

We study a negotiation model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. When players have different time preferences, delay can be Pareto efficient, thereby violates the presumption of the Hicks Paradox. We show that all equilibria are characterized by the extreme equilibria. Making unacceptable offers supports extreme equilibria, and significantly alters the backward-induction technique to find the extreme equilibrium payoffs. A playerʼs worst equilibrium payoff is characterized by a minmax problem involving efficient equilibrium payoffs that are above the bargaining frontier, which is possible when players have sufficiently different time preferences.

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