The Behavioral and Experimental Economics group has an influential position in this field in the Netherlands and Europe. CREED, the Amsterdam-based group, focuses particularly on three main projects: economics of political decision making; bounded rationality and institutions and experimental economics. The research of the Rotterdam-based group focuses on two broad themes: decision under risk and uncertainty and intertemporal choice.
- J. Hinloopen, A.M. Onderstal
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- European Economic Review, 2014, 70, 317-336
We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditional antitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniency program). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel deterrence, cartel stability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartel formation, destabilizes cartels, decreases cartel recidivism, and reduces the average winning bid. The leniency program has two perverse effects in FP: cartels become more stable and the average winning cartel bid decreases. At the same time, in both auctions the leniency program triggers many more cartels to be revealed. This suggests that it is misleading to use the number of revealed cartels as a measure of the effectiveness of the leniency program.
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