This paper studies the eﬀect of screening costs on the equilibrium allocation of workers with diﬀerent productivities to ﬁrms with diﬀerent technologies. In the model, a worker’s type is private information, but can be learned by the ﬁrm during a costly screening or interviewing process. We characterize the planner’s problem in this environment and determine its solution. A ﬁrm may receive applications from workers with diﬀerent productivities, but should in general not interview them all. Once a sufﬁciently good applicant has been found, the ﬁrm should instead make a hiring decision immediately. We show that the planner’s solution can be decentralized if workers direct their search to contracts posted by ﬁrms. These contracts must include the wage that the ﬁrm promises to pay to a worker of a particular type, as well as a hiring policy which indicates which types of workers will be hired immediately, and which types will lead the ﬁrm to keep interviewing additional applicants. Joint with Benjamin Lester.