Organizations and Markets Seminars

Roberto Weber (University of Zurich, Switzerland), Nicolas de Roos (The University of Sydney, Australia), Miguel Fonseca (University of Exeter, United Kingdom), Fabio Michelucci (CERGE-EI, Czech Republic), Eleftheria Triviza (University of Mannheim, Germany), Johannes Johnen (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium), Jens Prüfer (Tilburg University) and Andrej Woerner (University of Amsterdam)
Friday, 1 June 2018
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam, room 1.01AmsterdamNetherlands
Contact person(s)
Sander Onderstal, José Luis Moraga-González


Please register here.

Registration is free of charge, but registration is needed due to limited seating and to get the number of sandwiches right.

Invited speakers

Roberto Weber  (University of Zurich, Switzerland)
Miguel Fonseca (University of Exeter, United Kingdom)
Johannes Johnen (Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium)
Fabio Michelucci (CERGE-EI, Czech Republic)
Jens Prüfer (Tilburg University)
Nicolas de Roos (The University of Sydney, Australia)
Eleftheria Triviza (University of Mannheim, Germany)
Andrej Woerner (University of Amsterdam)

Available abstracts

Fabio Michelucci (CERGE-EI, Czech Republic)
‘How to Boost revenues in First-Price Auctions? The Magic of Disclosing Only Winning Bids from Past Auctions’

We evaluate the revenue implications of two disclosure policies commonly available in auction design: Disclosure of all bids from past auctions and disclosure of winning bids only. The results from our experiment show that disclosing only the winning bids in first-price auctions with two bidders leads to higher bids and higher revenues in the long run. We explain the finding by the presence of a share of subjects (naive bidders) who fail to understand that the information they are provided with might come from a selected sample when only winning bids are disclosed, and we provide a method to estimate this share. Accordingly, we find that 57% of subjects are naive, and revenues are higher by 6% when only winning bids are disclosed. Our finding may provide a novel rationale as to why sellers rarely disclose losing bids in the field. Joint with Philippe Jehiel  (PSE and UCL)  and Peter Katuscak (RWTH).