The financial crises has revived a heated debate on executive compensation that centers around the question whether executive pay is efficient, i.e. in the best interest of the companies. Many features of executive compensation, like high and increasing pay packages, large option holdings, and generous severance pay, are often cited as proof that current compensation practice and corporate governance is deeply flawed. In many cases, however, the scientific literature has been able to provide economic answers why seemingly inefficient pay arrangements might nevertheless be efficient.
This one-day workshop brings together leading scholars in the field of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance.
Confirmed invited speakers include:
- Jeffrey Coles (University of Utah)
- John Core (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
- Alex Edmans (London Business School)
- Yaniv Grinstein (Cornell University)
- Kai Li (University of British Columbia)
- Ronald Masulis (University of New South Wales)
- Oliver Spalt (Tilburg University)
- Laura Starks (University of Texas at Austin)
- David Yermack (New York University)