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14-016/II - Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts


  • Authors
    Rene van den Brink, VU University Amsterdam; Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University, Korea; Yuan Ju, University of York, United Kingdom
  • Publication date
    January 28, 2014
  • Keywords
    Queueing problem, minimal transfer rule, maximal transfer rule, Shapley value, bidding mechanism, implementation, Queuing problem
  • JEL
    C71, C72, D60