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Home | Events Archive | Markets with Asymmetric Information
Tinbergen Institute Lectures

Markets with Asymmetric Information

  • Series
    Economics Lecture Series
  • Speaker
    Jon Levin and Liran Einav (Stanford University)
  • Location
  • Date

    June 02, 2014 until June 04, 2014

Market failures and inefficiencies due to asymmetric information have been at the heart of recent policy debates about credit markets, health insurance, and other regulatory and social programs. While the theory of asymmetric information has been well-established for decades, empirical research that attempts to identify and measure the sources and consequences of asymmetric information has blossomed only in the last decade. These lectures covered recent work on demand, pricing, competition and regulation in markets with adverse selection and moral hazard problems, including consumer credit markets and insurance markets.

Jonathan Levin is the Philip H. Knight Professor and Dean of Stanford Graduate School of Business. Liran Einav is professor of economics at Stanford University.