• Graduate program
    • Why Tinbergen Institute?
    • Program Structure
    • Courses
    • Course Registration
    • Recent PhD Placements
    • Facilities
    • Admissions
  • Research
  • News
  • Events
    • Summer School
      • Crash Course in Experimental Economics
      • Introduction in Genome-Wide Data Analysis
      • Research on Productivity, Trade, and Growth
      • Econometric Methods for Forecasting and Data Science
  • Times
Home | Events Archive | Redesigning the Market for Volunteers: A Donor Registry
Seminar

Redesigning the Market for Volunteers: A Donor Registry


  • Series
    CREED Seminars
  • Speaker(s)
    Stephanie Heger (The University of Sydney, Australia)
  • Field
    Empirical Microeconomics
  • Location
    UvA - E-building, Roetersstraat 11, Room: E5.22
    Amsterdam
  • Date and time

    January 17, 2019
    16:00 - 17:15

This paper addresses volunteer labor markets where the lack of price signals, non-pecuniary motivations to supply labor, and limited fungibility of supply lead to market failure. To address the causes of the market failure, we conduct a field experiment with volunteer whole blood donors where we introduce a market-clearing mechanism (henceforth: the Registry). Our intention-to-treat estimates suggest that subjects invited to the Registry, regardless of joining, are 66 percent more responsive to critical shortage appeals than control subjects. While the registry increases supply during a critical shortage episode, it does not increase supply when there is no shortage; thus the Registry significantly improves coordination between volunteer donors and collection centers, thereby improving market outcomes. We find evidence that the Registry's effectiveness stems from crowding-in volunteers with purely altruistic motives and volunteers with a preference for commitment.