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Home | People | Otto Swank
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Otto Swank

Research Fellow

University
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Researchgroup
Organizations and Markets
Interests
organizational economics, personnel economics

Key publications

List of publications

Bijkerk,S.H. and Karamychev,V. and Swank,O.H.. 2018. When Words are not Enough. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 149, 294--314

Kamphorst,J.J.A. and Swank,O.H.. 2018. The role of performance appraisals in motivating employees. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 27, 251--269

Kamphorst,J.J.A. and Swank,O.H.. 2016. Don't Demotivate, Discriminate. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8, 140--165

Delfgaauw,J. and Swank,O.H.. 2016. Task-specific human capital and organizational inertia. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 25, 608--626

Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2015. Learning from others? Decision rights,strategic communication, and reputational concerns. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7, 109--149

Kamphorst,J.J.A. and Swank,O.H.. 2013. When Galatea cares about her reputation: How having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine. European Economic Review, 60, 91--104

Visser,B. and Swank,O.H. and Crutzen,B.S.Y.. 2013. Confidence Management: on Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22, 744--767

Visser,B. and Swank,O.H.. 2013. Is Transparency to no Avail? Committee Decision- Making, Pre- meetings, and Credible Deals. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 967--994

Swank,O.H.. 2010. Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians?. Journal of Health Economics, 29, 191--332

Swank,O.H. and Dominguez Martinez,S.. 2009. A Simple Model of Self-Assessment. Economic Journal, 119, 1225--1241

Swank,J. and Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2009. How committees of experts interact with the outside world: Some theory, and evidence from the FOMC. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 478--486

Dominguez Martinez,S. and Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2008. In defense of Boards. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17, 667--682

Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2008. The consequences of endogenizing information for the performance of a sequential decision procedure. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 667--681

Visser,B. and Swank,O.H.. 2007. On committees of experts. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 337--372

Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2007. Do Elections Lead to Informed Public Decisions?. Public Choice, 129, 435--460

Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2007. Motivating through delegating tasks of giving attention. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23, 731--742

Wrasai,P. and Swank,O.H.. 2007. Policy Makers, Advisers and Reputation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 579--590

Swank,O.H. and Dominguez Martinez,S.. 2006. Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control. Social Choice and Welfare, 26, 527--545

Dur,A.J. and Swank,O.H.. 2005. Producing and Manipulating Information. Economic Journal, 115, 185--199

Suurmond,G. and Swank,O.H. and Visser,B.. 2004. On the bad reputation of reputational concerns. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817--2838

Beniers,K.J. and Swank,O.H.. 2004. On the composition of committees. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20, 353--378

Ossokina,I. and Swank,O.H.. 2004. The optimal degree of polarization. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 255--262

Ossokina,I. and Swank,O.H.. 2003. Polarization, political instability and active learning. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105, 1--14

Swank,O.H.. 2002. Budgetary devices for spending prone ministers and bureaucrats. Public Choice, 111, 237--257

Swank,O.H.. 2001. A comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 46, 437--440

Swank,O.H. and Dur,A.J.. 2001. Why do policy makers give (permanent) power to policy advisers?. Economics and Politics, 13, 73--93

Letterie,W.A. and Swank,O.H. and van Dalen,H.P.. 2000. When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus. Social Choice and Welfare, 17, 439--461

Swank,O.H.. 2000. Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 257--271

Swank,O.H.. 2000. Why do workers spend so much time on inferior tasks. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156, 501--512

Swank,O.H. and Hillman,A.L.. 2000. Why political culture should be in the lexicon of economics. European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 1--5

Swank,O.H. and Peletier,B.D. and Dur,A.J.. 1999. Voting on the budget deficit: comment. American Economic Review, 1377--1381

Swank,O.H. and Letterie,W.A. and van Dalen,H.P.. 1999. A theory of policy advice. The Journal of Law and Economics, 10, 85--103

Swank,O.H. and Eisinga,R.. 1999. Economic outcomes and voting behaviour in a multi-party system: an application to the Netherlands. Public Choice, 101, 195--213

Dur,A.J. and Swank,O.H.. 1998. The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 561--572

Letterie,W.A. and Swank,O.H.. 1998. Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections. Economics and Politics, 10, 85--103

Swank,O.H.. 1998. Budgetary decisions. De Economist, 145, 127--129

Swank,O.H.. 1998. Partisan policies, macroeconomic performance an political support. Journal of Macroeconomics, 20, 367--386

Swank,O.H.. 1998. Towards an economic theory of ideology. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 223--240

Swank,O.H. and Letterie,W.A.. 1997. Learning and signalling by advisor selection. Public Choice, 92, 353--367

Swank,O.H.. 1997. Some evidence on policy makers' motives, macroeconomic performance and output-inflation trade-offs. Applied Economics, 29, 251--258

Lippi,F. and Swank,O.H.. 1996. Do policymakers' distributional desires lead to an inflationary bias?. Journal of Policy Modeling, 18, 109--116

Swank,O.H.. 1996. Partisan politics, divided government and the economy. De Economist, 144, 510--512

van Dalen,H.P. and Swank,O.H.. 1996. Government spending cycles: ideological or opportunistic?. Public Choice, 89, 183--200

Swank,O.H.. 1995. Rational voters in a partisanship model. Social Choice and Welfare, 12, 13--27

Siebrand,J.C. and Swank,O.H.. 1994. Partisan profiles in presidential policies. Journal of Macroeconomics, 16, 553--559

Swank,O.H.. 1994. Better monetary control may increase the inflationary bias of policy. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 96, 125--131

Swank,O.H.. 1994. Partisan views on the economy. Public Choice, 81, 137--150

Swank,O.H. and Swank,J.. 1993. In search of the motives behind US fiscal macroeconomic policy. Applied Economics, 25, 1013--1022